INTRODUCTION
In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the biggest question is often whether the individual is subject to a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). 1 The charge typically carries a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment.
2 However, the ACCA increases the statutory range from zero to ten years to fifteen years to life if the individual has three or more prior convictions that qualify as "violent felon[ies]" or "serious drug offense [s] ." Three routes exist by which a prior conviction can qualify as a "violent felony"-the elements clause, the enumerated-offenses clause, and the residual clause. Before 2015, courts safely housed most offenses within the residual clause. 4 Then, on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its monumental decision in Johnson II, invalidating the residual clause. 5 Subsequently, courts across the nation have reevaluated whether offenses that once qualified under the residual clause continue to qualify as ACCA predicate offenses. 6 Usually, the answer depends on whether the offense qualifies under the elements clause. 7 That clause requires courts to determine whether an offense has as an element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" against another person, or, as the 1 "The ACCA is one of the most onerous mandatory sentencing provisions found in the federal criminal code." Katherine Menendez, Johnson v Cir. 2015) . 7 See supra note 6.
Since Johnson II, the tension within the Eleventh Circuit has been palpable. There has been substantial and fervent disagreement about the meaning of Johnson I and the reach of Johnson II, and rightfully so. These decisions are important. They affect whether scores of people are condemned to serve years-if not decades-of additional prison time. 9 Given the importance of these issues, this Article examines that tension, including three ways the court got it wrong-specifically, the court's unusual conduct in ruling on requests to file second or successive post-conviction motions based on Johnson II, and recent rulings on whether the Florida offenses of robbery and felony battery qualify as ACCA predicate offenses. 10 
II. THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT & BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
The ACCA is a recidivist sentencing enhancement that applies to defendants convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. 11 Normally, this conviction carries a statutory maximum sentence of ten years' imprisonment for such convictions.
12 But if a defendant has three or more prior convictions for a "violent felony" or a "serious drug offense," the ACCA requires a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years. 13 The ACCA defines a "violent felony" as a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that: (1) "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" ("the elements clause"); (2) "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives" ("the enumerated-offenses clause"); or (3) "otherwise involves conduct 8 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) . 9 See United States v. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156, 1179 (11th Cir. 2016) (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) ("In recent years, around 700 defendants each year have been convicted in [the Eleventh] Circuit of being a felon in possession of a firearm . . . . These numbers . . . mean that thousands of defendants stand to have their sentences increased by at least five years . . . ."). 10 See infra Parts IV & V. 11 18 U.S.C. § § 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012). 12 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 13 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" ("the residual clause").
14 Determining whether an offense satisfies one of the ACCA clauses implicates several highly technical legal principles, and those principles may apply differently depending on the clause at issue. For example, in analyzing whether a prior conviction qualifies as a "violent felony," courts must use a categorical approach, examining only the statutory elements of an offense, rather than the facts underlying a conviction. 15 However, the categorical approach is applied differently depending on the clause involved. Under the elements clause and enumerated-offenses clause, courts must assume an offense was committed by the least of the acts criminalized under the state statute. 16 The residual clause, on the other hand, requires 14 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 15 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). The only instance in which a court may look at the records relating to a defendant's prior conviction is if the defendant's statute of conviction is "divisible," meaning the statute sets forth alternative elements that a jury must choose between, and one of the alternatives would not qualify as a "violent felony." See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257-58 (2013) . This is called the modified categorical approach, and under this approach, courts may examine a limited universe of judicially-approved materials called Shepard documents, including the indictment, jury instructions, and plea agreement, to determine the element under which the defendant was convicted. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) . The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the modified categorical approach "merely helps implement the categorical approach when a defendant was convicted of violating a divisible statute." Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263. If a statute does not set forth alternative elements, but a single "indivisible" element, the modified categorical approach does not apply. Id. at 258-59. Often, the line between a divisible, disjunctively phrased set of elements and an indivisible, disjunctively phrased set of factual means of accomplishing a single element can be murky. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016) . But the Supreme Court has clarified that elements are the "things [that] must be charged" in a statute for conviction, while means "need not be." Id. at 2256. If a statute comprises indivisible means, courts must apply the categorical approach, without using Shepard documents to identify which means was committed. Id. at 2255. 16 courts to determine the conduct and degree of risk involved in the "ordinary case" of an offense. 17 In Johnson II, the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause, forcing courts across the nation to reconsider whether convictions which had qualified under the residual clause still qualified under the elements or enumerated-offenses clauses. 18 Most of these evaluations revolved around the Supreme Court's interpretation of the elements clause in Johnson I.
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A.
The 20 Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The void-for-vagueness doctrine bars the Government from "taking away someone's life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement." Id. at 2556 (internal citations omitted). 21 Id. at 2557; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018). 22 Id. (stating that the ACCA's residual clause left "grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime" since "[i]t ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined 'ordinary case' of a crime"). 23 Id. at 2558 ("It is one thing to apply an imprecise 'serious potential risk' standard to real-world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined abstraction.").
"serious potential risk of physical injury" by considering not the defendant's actual conduct but an "idealized ordinary case of the crime."
The Court's analysis in Johnson [I] thus cast no doubt on the many laws that "require gauging the riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant engages on a particular occasion." The residual clause failed not because it adopted a "serious potential risk" standard but because applying that standard under the categorical approach required courts to assess the hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of the offense. In the Johnson [I] Court's view, the "indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry" made the residual clause more unpredictable and arbitrary in its application than the Constitution allows. "Invoking so shapeless a provision . . . does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process." 24 Thus, the Supreme Court held that increasing a defendant's sentence under the residual clause is a denial of due process.
25

B.
The Elements Clause & Johnson I Without the residual clause, the validity of thousands of ACCA enhancements now depends on whether predicate convictions qualify under the elements clause-in other words, whether certain offenses have as an element the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" against another person. elements clause. 28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the "physical force" requirement for the first time. 29 The Johnson I Court held that in the context of the statutory definition of a "violent felony," "physical force" means "violent force-that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." 30 31 Id. ("When the adjective 'violent' is attached to the noun 'felony,' its connotation of strong physical force is even clearer."). 32 Flores, 350 F.3d at 672. 33 Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 139 (noting that the plain meaning of "force" suggests "a degree of power that would not be satisfied by the merest touching").
U.S.C. § 2255, the primary vehicle by which prisoners seek to vacate, set aside, or correct their judgments. 34 The answer would affect inmates across the nation. And to be sure, the issue was time-sensitive. Under § 2255(f)(3), prisoners have only one year from the date the Supreme Court recognizes a new right to file a § 2255 motion, if the right applies retroactively on collateral review. 35 The rules are even stricter for inmates who have previously filed a § 2255 motion. 36 Once an inmate files one § 2255 motion, he cannot file a "second or successive" § 2255 motion unless the new right: (1) is "a new rule of constitutional law"; (2) "made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court"; and (3) the court of appeals grants the inmate permission to file such a motion. 37 Most inmates seeking post-conviction relief 34 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012) ("A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.").
35 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) ("A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review . . . ."). Inmates have one year to file a post-conviction motion, and that one-year clock begins to run based on the occurrence of one of four triggering events. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The most common triggering event is the date the prisoner's "judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1 43 To decide that narrow issue, however, the Court had to resolve a broader legal question-whether Johnson II applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. 44 The answer would affect thousands of inmates in the Eleventh Circuit. 45 To resolve that question, the Court applied the framework set forth 42 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the denial of a § 2255 motion cannot be appealed unless a circuit judge or district court judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2012). To obtain a COA, a movant must make a "substantial showing" that his constitutional right has been denied. 28 
"). "[A]
case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the . . . Government." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. "To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. A holding is only dictated by precedent if it would have been "apparent to all reasonable jurists." Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1997). However, a case does not announce a new rule "when it is merely an application of the principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts." Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347-48 (2013) (internal quotes and alterations omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307). 50 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 ("The parties agree that Johnson does not fall into the limited second category for watershed procedural rules."). A new watershed rule of criminal procedural implicates "the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings." Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495. "Although the precise contours of this exception may be difficult to discern," the Supreme Court has generally cited Gideon v. Wainwright, which held "that a defendant has the right to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of rule coming within the exception." Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)). 51 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264-65. A rule is substantive if it "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes," including rules "that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms," and "constitutional de-procedures by which the statute is applied, and therefore, Johnson II applied retroactively. 52 The Court, however, declined to wade into the merits of Mr. Welch's motion, remanding the case to the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether Mr. Welch's Florida conviction for robbery still qualified as an ACCA predicate offense under the elements clause.
B.
The Summer of SOS Orders After Welch was issued on April 18, 2016, inmates had slightly more than two months-until the one-year anniversary of Johnson II-to submit applications to the Eleventh Circuit for leave to file second or successive § 2255 motions, obtain approval, and file the motions in the district court. 54 Thousands did.
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terminations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the [government's] power to punish." Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351-53. On the other hand, procedural rules regulate "the manner of determining the defendant's culpability." Id. at 353. For example, rules that alter "the range of permissible methods for determining whether a defendant's conduct is punishable." Id. 52 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. The Court noted that not every decision altering the scope of a statute is a substantive decision. Id. at 1268. For example, a decision altering the scope of a procedural statute, such as one regulating the admission of evidence at trial, would itself be a procedural decision, and not retroactive on collateral review. Id. 53 Id. ("It may well be that the Court of Appeals on remand will determine on other grounds that the District Court was correct to deny Welch's motion to amend his sentence. For instance, the parties continue to dispute whether Welch's strongarm robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of the Act, which would make Welch eligible for a 15-year sentence regardless of Johnson."). The circumstances under which the Eleventh Circuit rules on these applications are unusual. When ruling on such applications, the court must determine whether the applicant makes a "prima facie showing" that his claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court. 56 The applications are typically filed pro se, on a form provided by the Eleventh Circuit, with no briefing. 57 The court must rule on them within 30 days. 58 If a claim is rejected, an applicant cannot bring the claim again, even if there is a later change in the law that shows he should have been granted authorization. 59 What's more, the Eleventh Circuit's rulings on these applications cannot be reconsidered by the court or reviewed by the Supreme Court. . A prisoner may also seek authorization when his claim relies on "newly discovered evidence that . . . would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (2012) . 57 See United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 2016) (Martin, J., concurring) ("These applications are almost always filed by prisoners with no lawyers. They include no briefs. In fact, the form used by prisoners for these applications forbids the prisoner from filing briefs or any attachments, unless the form is filed by a prisoner suffering under a death sentence.").
58 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) ("The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion."). It seems that the Eleventh Circuit "is the only court to force a decision on every one of these cases within 30 days of filing." In re Leonard, 655 F. App'x at 777 (Martin, J., concurring). Other courts have held that the thirty-day limitations period is advisory rather than mandatory. Orona v. United States, 826 F.3d 1196, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1997) . 59 In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating that § 2244(b)(1) provides that a repetitious filing "shall be dismissed," and noting that the word "shall" does not convey discretion); see In re Parrish, No. 17-11523, slip op. at 4 (11th Cir. May 5, 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) ("So we now know that, as he has told us all along, Mr. Parrish's ACCA sentence is not lawful . . . . But again, because this panel made a mistake in denying Mr. Parrish's first application, Baptiste prevents us from even considering his application today.").
60 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) ("The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.").
In the four months after Welch, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on hundreds of Johnson II-based applications ("SOS orders"). 61 Of the hundreds, 33 were published. 62 That means the court, racing to issue orders in a short 30-day window, created unreviewable precedent based on forms filled out by pro se prisoners. Many, if not most, of those decisions were splintered. 63 And in ruling on these applications, the Eleventh Circuit went beyond merely determining whether "This means no motion for reconsideration, no motion for en banc review, no appeal, and no petition for cert. Circuit, which-contrary to our precedent-resolved a merits question in the context of a motion to authorize a second or successive habeas petition."); In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1312 (Martin, J., concurring) ("[T]his effort sets our court apart . . . . other courts are not scrutinizing the merits of these cases at this stage."); Id. at 1312 n.7 ("I am aware of no order from another court of appeals that combs through an applicant's presentence investigation report to decide the merits of his yet-unfiled motion without ever hearing from a lawyer. And our court has done this in hundreds of cases."). 67 See In re McCall, 826 F.3d at 1312 (Martin, J., concurring) ("Our court's massive effort to decide the merits of hundreds of habeas cases within 30 days each, all over a span of just a few weeks, has been largely hidden from public view. Very few of our orders in these cases are reported or posted on the court's website, which means no lawyer is likely to see them.").
IV. FLORIDA ROBBERY & THE ELEMENTS CLAUSE
In Johnson I, the Supreme Court observed that the term "physical force" suggests a "substantial degree of force." 68 However, before Johnson II, most offenses fell within the broad sweep of the residual clause, so courts could avoid engaging in elements clause analyses. 69 But after Johnson II, the elements clause has become the default home for many offenses under the ACCA. 70 So the following question is more important than ever-what is a "substantial degree of force"?
In Welch, the Supreme Court left open whether a Florida conviction for robbery qualifies as a "violent felony" under the elements clause. 71 Since then, the issue has not only placed the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits at odds, but, broadly speaking, created tension among the circuits about the amount of force required.
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The Florida Robbery Statute Florida's robbery statute, Fla. Stat. § 812.13, defines robbery as:
[T]he taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. The various degrees of robbery, unchanged since 1974, depend on whether the perpetrator "carried" a firearm, deadly weapon, weapon, or no weapon. 74 A firearm or weapon that is "carried" by the perpetrator, though, need not have been "used" in the robbery. In fact, the victim need not even be aware of the firearm or weapon.
B.
The (Fla. 1984 ) ("[T]he statutory element which enhances punishment for armed robbery is not the use of the deadly weapon, but the mere fact that a deadly weapon was carried by the perpetrator. The victim may never even be aware that a robber is armed, so long as the perpetrator has the weapon in his possession during the offense."); State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 413 (Fla. 2004 ) ("In Baker, we recognized the distinction between carrying a deadly weapon and using a deadly weapon"). "The offense of robbery while armed contains, in addition to its other constituent statutory elements, the element that the accused carried a firearm or other deadly weapon. The elements of the crime do not include displaying the weapon or using it in perpetrating the robbery." Williams v 84 In Lockley, the court considered whether a 2001 Florida conviction for attempted robbery qualified as a "crime of violence" under USSG § 4B1.2, the federal sentencing guideline for career offenders. 85 Applying the categorical approach, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the least culpable Id. 79 Compare id. at 1339, 1341 (majority opinion) ("My view is that Dowd and its progeny control under our prior panel precedent rule,"), with id. at 1346 (Badlock, J., concurring) ("I would . . . leave for another day the question of the continuing viability of Dowd."), and id. at 1348 (Martin, J., concurring) ("Dowd is no longer good law."). 80 In 86 The court found it "inconceivable" that this type of conduct "would not involve the use or threatened use of physical force." 87 Because the guidelines' commentary stated that "the attempt to commit a 'crime of violence' is itself a 'crime of violence,'" the Eleventh Circuit found that Mr. Lockley's conviction for attempted robbery qualified as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause. 88 The court alternatively concluded that Mr. Lockley's conviction also qualified under both the residual clause and the guidelines' commentary, which enumerated robbery as a "crime of violence."
89 Notably, attempted robbery conviction under § 812.13(1) counts as a 'crime of violence' within the meaning of the identically-worded elements clause of the Sentencing Guidelines."). At that time, the definition of a "violent felony" under the ACCA and a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines were substantially similar. Compare U.
S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). Moreover, the definitions had identical elements clauses and residual clauses. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)
. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit considered cases interpreting the language in one definition as authoritative in cases interpreting the language in the other. Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1243 n.5 ("Though ACCA's 'violent felony' enhancement and the Guidelines' career offender enhancement differ slightly in their wording, we apply the same analysis to both."). 86 Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1244-45. 87 Id. at 1245. 88 Id. The ACCA has no such commentary, so whether an attempted robbery qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA requires the court to determine whether the least culpable act for committing an attempted robbery has as an element the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. " 91 In Welch, the Eleventh Circuit held that this conviction qualified as a "violent felony" under the ACCA's residual clause. 92 The court, however, declined to address whether such a conviction qualified under the elements clause. 93 The year in which Welch's offense occurred-before or after 1997-was critical to the court's analysis 94 because Florida law relating to robbery qualitatively changed in 1997. 95 The Welch court explained that in 1976, the Florida Supreme Court stated, "[a]ny degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery."
96 Thereafter, "the state courts of appeal were divided on whether a snatching, as of a purse, or cash from a person's hand, or jewelry on the person's body, amounted to robbery." 97 Then, in 1997, the Florida Supreme Court decided Robinson v. State, holding that "for the snatching of property from another to amount to robbery, the perpetrator must employ more than the force necessary to remove the property from the person. Rather, there must be resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the 90 2000)). 100 Id. at 1311-12. 101 Id. 102 Id. at 1312. 103 Id. at 1312-13. 104 Id. at 1313.
clause. 105 Ultimately, however, the court was unable to address this question because Mr. Seabrooks' conviction was imposed four months after the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Robinson, and was therefore governed by Lockley. 106 The court, nevertheless, issued deeply divided dicta about the continuing validity of Dowd and whether there was truly a distinction between pre-1997 and post-1997 robberies. 107 Judge Hull, on the one hand, believed Dowd remained binding precedent, which was confirmed by the SOS decisions relying on Dowd. 108 She also believed that anything Welch said about the elements clause was not only dicta "but wrong dicta" because Robinson was stating "what the statute always meant." 109 Therefore, according to Judge Hull, there was no distinction between pre-1997 and post-1997 robberies. 110 In her view, robberies committed through the use of "force," no matter when they occurred, had always required enough force to overcome a victim's resistance. 111 And based on Lockley and Dowd, that type of robbery qualified as a "violent felony" under the elements clause. 112 Judge Martin, on the other hand, believed Dowd's holding had been abrogated "in light of the clarifications given to us by the Supreme Court about what steps we must take when applying the categorical approach."
113 Nowhere in Dowd, Judge Martin stated, did the court: "(1) consult state law to identify the least culpable conduct for which an armed robbery conviction could be sustained; (2) analyze whether that least culpable conduct was encompassed by the generic federal offense; or (3) 123 See Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1352 (Martin, J., concurring) (stating that Welch "binds us whenever we apply the categorical approach to analyze a Florida a sudden snatching did not qualify as a "violent felony" under the elements clause. 124 At the end of the day though, despite their disagreements, everyone agreed Mr. Seabrooks' case was governed by Lockley, so Judge Hull's and Judge Martin's dueling dicta was ultimately just that-dicta. 125 Three weeks later, without holding oral argument, Judge Hull made her side of the story binding precedent in United States v. Fritts. In Fritts, the court held that under Dowd and Lockley, a 1989 Florida conviction for armed robbery qualified as a "violent felony" under the elements clause. 126 As a result, all Florida convictions for robbery, regardless of when they occurred, qualify as "violent felon[ies]" under the ACCA's elements clause. 127 robbery conviction from a time before the Florida Supreme court decided Robinson."). 124 See Stokeling, 684 F. App'x at 874 (Martin, J., concurring) ("Sudden snatching with 'any degree of force,' plainly does not require the use of 'a substantial degree of force.' Neither does it necessarily entail 'violent force-that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.'") (internal citations omitted). 125 Since Fritts, the Eleventh Circuit has not only declined to rehear the issue en banc, where it could reconsider the issue unencumbered by the weight of prior panel precedent, 128 but has granted motions for summary affirmance, disposing of appeals without issuing even an unpublished opinion. 129 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has made it undeniably clear that it will not reconsider whether Florida robbery is a "violent felony." Right or wrong, this has "enormous consequences for many criminal defendants who come before [the] [c]ourt." 130 
D.
Overcoming Resistance Does Not Require Violent "Physical Force" One critical point of contention between Judge Hull and Judge Martin is whether the standard set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in Robinson-force sufficient to overcome resistance-governs when evaluating the least culpable act for robbery convictions imposed between June 1976 and April 1997. 131 However, in Seabrooks, both agreed that after April 1997, the least culpable act is placing a victim in fear, which qualifies under the elements clause. 132 The truth is, they are both wrong about post-1997 robberies. Even if force sufficient to overcome resistance has always been the standard, committing a robbery by "force" is still the least culpable act under the robbery statute because using such force does not categorically require the use of "a substantial degree of force." 133 Therefore, a Florida conviction for robbery never qualifies as a "violent felony." 134 Under Robinson, a robbery occurs when a victim resists and the defendant uses enough force to overcome that resistance. 135 Thus, if a victim's resistance is minimal, the force needed to overcome that resistance is also minimal. Indeed, Florida caselaw is clear that a defendant may be convicted of robbery even if he uses only a minimal amount of force.
136 A conviction may be imposed if a defendant: (1) bumps someone from behind; 137 (2) engages in a tug-of-war over 133 Recently, one Eleventh Circuit judge also concluded that overcoming resistance does not require the use of "physical force. n order for the snatching of property from another to amount to robbery, the perpetrator must employ more than the force necessary to remove the property from the person. Rather, there must be resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the offender."). 136 Id. (Fla. 1903) . In Colby, the defendant was caught during an attempted pickpocketing. Id. The victim grabbed the defendant's arm, and the defendant struggled to escape. Id. Under the robbery statute in effect at the time, the Florida Supreme Court held it was not a robbery because the force was used to escape, rather than secure the money. Id. However, the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that this conduct would have qualified as a robbery under the current robbery statute. See Robinson, 692 So. 2d at 887 n.10 ("Although the crime in Colby was held to be larceny, it would be robbery under the current version of the robbery statute because the perpetrator used force to escape the victim's grasp."). Indeed, Florida courts have made clear that if a pickpocket "jostles the owner, or if the owner, catching the pickpocket in the act, struggles unsuccessfully to keep possession," a robbery has been committed. Rigell Cir. 2016 ) (holding that a Massachusetts conviction for armed robbery, which requires only the possession of a firearm (without using or even displaying it), does not qualify as a "violent felony" under the ACCA's elements clause). may violate Florida's robbery statute without using violent force. 146 Although the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have both recognized that the Florida robbery statute requires an individual use enough force to overcome a victim's resistance, the Ninth Circuit stated that it believed the Eleventh Circuit "overlooked the fact that, if resistance itself is minimal, then the force used to overcome that resistance is not necessarily violent force." 147 The issue of whether force sufficient to overcome resistance categorically requires the use of violent force is not unique to Florida's robbery statute. It affects robbery statutes throughout the nation. In fact, most states permit robbery convictions where the degree of force used is sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance. Indeed, at least fifteen states use some variation of this standard in the text of their statutes, 148 and several others have adopted it through caselaw. 149 Since Johnson II, several circuits have had to reevaluate whether these statutes and others still qualify as "violent felon[ies]" under the ACCA's elements clause. 150 And these courts have reached differing conclusions. As a result, significant tension has arisen about the degree of force a state robbery statute must require to satisfy the elements clause. 151 The Fourth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Gardner and United States v. Winston are instructive in this regard. 152 In Winston, the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia conviction for common law robbery committed by "violence" does not categorically require the use of "physical force." 153 Such a robbery is committed when a defendant employs "anything which calls out resistance." 154 A conviction may be imposed even if a defendant does not "actual [ly] harm" the victim. 155 Rejecting the government's argument that overcoming resistance satisfies the elements clause. the Fourth Circuit held that the minimal force required under Virginia law does not rise to the level of violent "physical force." 156 In Gardner, the Fourth Circuit held that a North Carolina conviction for common law robbery does not qualify as a "violent felony" under the elements clause because it does not categorically require the use of "physical force." 157 A North Carolina common law robbery may be committed by force so long as the force "is sufficient to compel a victim to part with his property."
158 "This definition," the Fourth Circuit stated, "suggests that even de minimis con-tact can constitute the 'violence' necessary for a common law robbery conviction under North Carolina law." 159 The Fourth Circuit then discussed two North Carolina state cases that supported its conclusion. 160 Based on these decisions, the Fourth Circuit held that "the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a conviction for North Carolina common law robbery does not necessarily" require "physical force," and therefore the offense does not categorically qualify as a "violent felony" under the elements clause. 161 Like the Virginia offense described in Winston and the North Carolina offense addressed in Gardner, a Florida robbery may be committed by force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance. 162 As the Fourth Circuit recognized, this definition suggests that so long as a victim's resistance is slight, a defendant need only use minimal force to commit a robbery. 163 And, as explained above, Florida caselaw confirms this point.
During the writing of this Article, the issue came to a head in the Supreme Court. Proving the point that this issue affects many individuals, sixteen different petitions simultaneously sought review of whether Florida robbery is a "violent felony" under the ACCA. 164 The Supreme Court granted one of those petitions -Stokeling v.
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United States -and is holding the rest pending that decision. 165 Stokeling is the first elements clause case the Supreme Court has taken since Johnson I and provides the Court a much-needed opportunity to reinforce what it said there -that "physical force" requires "a substantial degree of force." 166 At a minimum, it requires more than the minimal force needed. 167 V.
FLORIDA FELONY BATTERY & THE ELEMENTS CLAUSE
Like the Florida robbery issue, the issue of whether a Florida conviction for felony battery qualifies as a "violent felony" under the elements clause has fractured the Eleventh Circuit. 168 The statute has precipitated a tug-of-war over the contours of Johnson I's "physical force" definition. While one side calls for an exclusive focus on the defendant's act, the other side calls for consideration of the result a defendant's act has on a victim. 169 A Florida felony battery can be committed through the same "touch" addressed in Johnson I, but with the additional element that the defendant's action unintentionally causes a victim great bodily harm. 170 Considering the Supreme Court has held a touch does not require "violent force," reviewing the Florida felony battery statute would provide the Court with an ideal opportunity to end this tug-of-war.
A.
The However, the three differ in their second elements. Simple battery does not have another element, while both felony battery and aggravated battery require that a victim suffer "great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement." 174 The difference between the two is that aggravated battery requires that the defendant intend the injury; felony battery does not. 175 Thus, the issue in United States v. Vail-Bailon and the following cases is whether a "touch" that unintentionally results in great bodily harm categorically requires the use of "violent force." 176 
B.
The Unpublished Decisions-Eugene, Crawford, and Eady Before Vail-Bailon, the Eleventh Circuit had issued three unpublished decisions addressing whether a Florida conviction for felony battery requires violent "physical force." 177 The first decision was United States v. Eugene, which was issued in 2011. 178 In Eugene, the court was called upon to determine whether felony battery qualified as a "crime of violence" under the federal sentencing guidelines. 179 'crime of violence' under the sentencing guidelines are virtually identical, we consider cases interpreting one as authority in cases interpreting the other."). 180 Id. at 911 (internal citations omitted). 181 Id. 182 United States v. Crawford, 568 F. App'x 725 (11th Cir. 2014). 183 Id. at 728 ("Crawford argues that his prior conviction in Florida for felony battery does not qualify as a violent felony . . . ."). Although Crawford challenged only the district court's finding about his felony battery conviction, he also had convictions for "the sale or delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, the possession of cocaine, manslaughter with a firearm or deadly weapon, attempted armed robbery, and attempted robbery during a home invasion." Id. 184 Id. 185 United States v. Eady, 591 F. App'x 711, 719 (11th Cir. 2014) (" [U] nlike convictions for simple felony battery where no injury is required, convictions under § 784.041 require significant bodily harm, disability, or disfigurement. It is incorrect to say that a person can 'actually and intentionally' hit another person and cause 'great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement' without using 'force capable of causing physical pain or injury.'"). The court held Mr. Eady's felony battery conviction also qualified as a "violent felony" under the ACCA's residual clause. Id. at 719-20.
Under the Flores definition, Mr. Vail-Bailon's felony battery conviction did not categorically require the use of "physical force," because the resulting injury was not a "likely" or "intended" result of the touch. 197 First, "great bodily harm" is not necessarily "likely" to result from a touch. 198 That a touch actually results in "great bodily harm" did not "somehow change[] the character of the mere touching from an action that is not likely to result in bodily harm to one that is likely to result in bodily harm." 199 The panel noted that felony battery could be committed, for instance, by an offender who taps another person on the shoulder while that person stands near the top of stairs, causing the person to be startled and fall down the stairs. 200 Thus, the results of a touching do not alter the nature of the touching. 201 Thus, the majority focused on whether the act of touching required the proper degree of force, while the dissent favored a backward-looking analysis, assuming that a touch causing an injury was different from a touch that did not. 206 At the end of the day, the VailBailon panel found that a touch is a touch-and because the touch in felony battery is no more "likely" or "intended" to result in injury than simple battery, Johnson I dictated that felony battery could not satisfy the elements clause. 207 The dispute, however, was far from over.
D.
The En Banc Decision in Vail-Bailon The tension in the Eleventh Circuit over the proper elements clause analysis came to a head when the court reheard Vail-Bailon en banc. 208 In a 6-5 decision, the court held that felony battery categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause. 209 Like the dissent in the original panel opinion, the en banc majority shunned the Flores analysis in favor of a pure "capability" test. 210 In the majority's view, adopting the Flores definition would disregard the capability standard explicitly articulated in Johnson I. 211 The majority reasoned that "having cited Flores, the Supreme Court was aware of how the Seventh Circuit had defined physical force, but the Court deliberately opted for a different definition." 212 means, the en banc majority viewed Flores as an opposing standard. 213 Moreover, the en banc majority rejected the argument that its decision would swallow Johnson I's holding that the touch required for a simple battery is not "capable of" causing physical injury. 214 The majority reasoned that "[t]his argument rests on a faulty premise that every slight touch is always capable of causing pain or injury," and distinguished between "a statute requiring nothing more than a slight touch" and "a statute requiring a touch that is forceful enough to cause great bodily harm."
215 Furthermore, the en banc majority was unpersuaded by the same hypotheticals that the panel majority had found convincing because the factual scenarios proposed in the hypotheticals had never occurred in Florida caselaw. 216 In its view, the hypotheticals were far-fetched and incorrectly applied the leastculpable-act rule. 217 Thus, the en banc majority did not believe that a touch was a touch. Instead, the resulting injury required by the felony battery statute necessarily meant that the touch was "capable At the end of the day, each side believed its definition of physical force reflected the purest reading of Johnson I. While five judges believed that the Johnson I Court intended the capability phrase to underscore the strong degree of force required, six believed that the Johnson I Court instead meant that an elements clause analysis should begin and end with capability. 225 Consequently, on rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit changed course and held that felony battery categorically requires the use of violent "physical force."
E.
A Touch that Unintentionally Results in Injury Does Not Require Violent "Physical Force" The Eleventh Circuit's dispute about felony battery reflects a fundamental disagreement about the proper reading of Johnson I's "physical force" definition. Because the felony battery statute comprises a volitional act that, by itself, requires minimal contact coupled with an unintentional but serious physical consequence, it provides the ideal vehicle for the Supreme Court to resolve this disagreement. Both sides agree that under Johnson I, a mere touch, without more, cannot satisfy the elements clause. However, they disagree on whether the consequences that flow from that touch affects the elements clause analysis.
227
In Mr. Vail-Bailon's case, the Eleventh Circuit provided at least three possible answers to this question. First, the original panel majority believed that the Supreme Court clarified its capability analysis by citing Flores' analysis and stated that a mere touch was not and suffer a concussion, have you committed a violent act? Most would say no. But if you punch the jogger and the punch causes him to fall, hit his head, and suffer a concussion, you have undoubtedly committed a violent act. The difference between a non-violent and violent act, then, is the degree of force used. Both a tap and a punch are capable of causing great bodily harm, but a tap involves a limited degree of force while a punch involves a substantial degree of force. Or, in the words of the Sentencing Guidelines, a punch involves "physical force." Id. at 1308. 225 because a touch is theoretically "capable of" causing pain or injury. 236 But as Judge Wilson aptly put it, " [a] spitball that happens to cause great bodily harm is still just a spitball. A mere touching that happens to cause great bodily harm is still just a mere touching." 237 Thus, it makes little sense that the Supreme Court would create a test that would dictate the opposite conclusion of its own holding. 238 Given that the Supreme Court "took the time to pen a thorough discussion of 'physical force' . . . [w]e should take that entire discussion into account. When we do, it is apparent that the [capability] sentence does not discard degree of force for a capacity test." 239 Although Johnson I held that a mere touch is not enough force, 240 there is significant disagreement over the proper form that an elements clause analysis should take: a degree-of-force focus or a capability-of-causing-injury focus. Although Stokeling will provide guidance on the amount of force required, Florida robbery has no harm element. 241 Therefore, it may not resolve the issue addressed in Vail-Bailon. Given the Supreme Court's silence on this issue and the significant need for greater guidance on the elements clause analysis, the Supreme Court should review the Florida felony battery issue to clarify whether an offense that requires great bodily 236 
Id.
Any unwanted touching could cause pain or injury. A tap on a pedestrian's shoulder could distract the pedestrian causing her to collide with another person and suffer injury. A student's spitball could hit its victim in the eye causing injury. A pat on the back could startle the victim causing her to jerk her body and suffer pain. A child's innocent pinching of his friend could cause the friend to experience a sharp pain. Id. 237 Id. at 1312. Judge Wilson also rejected the en banc majority's view that the hypotheticals involving touches that resulted in great bodily harm were farfetched-one, because the hypotheticals were realistic scenarios in his view, and two, because the text of the felony battery statute and Florida courts explicitly defined the act as a touch. Id. at n.4. 238 Id. at 1313. 239 Id. at 1314. harm necessarily requires the use of "a substantial degree of force."
242
VI. CONCLUSION
To be sure, this is a touchy subject. The social and economic stakes are high. These issues affect thousands of individuals now and into the future, consigning them to years of additional imprisonment. The disagreements throughout the circuits show there are no easy answers. Indeed, this tug-of-war has forced the Supreme Court to step in. Certainly, violent individuals deserve stiff sentences. However, the desire to see violent individuals punished does not give courts license to disregard the Supreme Court's directives about the application of the elements clause. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will use Stokeling as an opportunity to illuminate what it meant in Johnson I -that "physical force" requires a substantial degree of force.
